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Abstract
We develop a tractable multi-country overlapping-generations model and show
that cross-country dierences in nancial development explain three recent empirical
patterns of international capital 
ows. Domestic nancial frictions in our model
distort interest rates and aggregate output in the less nancially developed countries.
International capital 
ows help ameliorate the two distortions.
International 
ows of nancial capital and foreign direct investment aect ag-
gregate output in each country directly through aecting the size of aggregate in-
vestment. In addition, they aect aggregate output indirectly through aecting the
composition of aggregate investment and the size of aggregate savings. Under cer-
tain conditions, the indirect eects may dominate the direct eects so that, despite
\uphill" net capital 
ows, full capital mobility may raise the steady-state aggre-
gate output in the poor country as well as raise world output. However, if foreign
direct investment is restricted, \uphill" nancial capital 
ows strictly reduce the
steady-state aggregate output in the poor countries and it is more likely that the
steady-state world output is lower than under international nancial autarky.
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11 Introduction
This paper analyzes how the recent empirical patterns of international capital 
ows may
aect the steady-state aggregate output at the country level as well as at the world level.
According to the conventional neoclassical theory, capital should 
ow \downhill" from the
rich country where the marginal return on capital is low to the poor country where the
marginal return on capital is high. As a result, world output should be higher than under
international nancial autarky (IFA, hereafter). Meanwhile, there would be no dierence
between gross and net capital 
ows because capital 
ows would be unidirectional.
The recent empirical patterns of international capital 
ows are in stark contrast to
these predictions (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2001, 2007a,b). First, capital in the net
term 
ows \uphill" from poor to rich countries (Prasad, Rajan, and Subramanian, 2006,
2007). Second, nancial capital 
ows from poor to rich countries, while foreign direct
investment (FDI, hereafter) 
ows in the opposite direction (Ju and Wei, 2010). Third,
despite its negative net positions of international investment since 1986, the U.S. has
been receiving a positive net investment income until 2005 (Gourinchas and Rey, 2007;
Hausmann and Sturzenegger, 2007; Higgins, Klitgaard, and Tille, 2007). According to
conventional neoclassical models (Matsuyama, 2004), \uphill" net capital 
ows reduce
aggregate output in the poor country as well as world output. It implies that the recent
wave of nancial globalization is a negative-sum game where the welfare losses in the
poor country exceeds the welfare gains in the rich country. However, before evaluating
the welfare implications of international capital 
ows, we should rst develop a model
which has the theoretical predictions in line with the empirical patterns.
Recent research oers two main explanations to these empirical facts. Devereux and
Sutherland (2009) and Tille and van Wincoop (2008, 2010) focus on the risk-sharing that
investors can achieve by diversifying investment globally. International portfolio invest-
ment is determined by the cross-correlation patterns of aggregate shocks hitting individual
economies. These models do not distinguish between FDI and portfolio investment. The
second strand of literature emphasizes the implications of domestic nancial market im-
perfections on the patterns of international capital 
ows (Antras and Caballero, 2009;
Antras, Desai, and Foley, 2009; Aoki, Benigno, and Kiyotaki, 2009; Caballero, Farhi, and
Gourinchas, 2008; Mendoza, Quadrini, and Rios-Rull, 2009; Smith and Valderrama, 2008).
Ju and Wei (2008, 2010) show that cross-country dierences in various aspects jointly gen-
erate the two-way 
ows of nancial capital and FDI. The distinction between FDI and
portfolio investment plays a key role in their models. However, most models address the
current account determination without analyzing the aggregate output implications at
2the country or at the world level.
Following the second strand of the literature, we develop a tractable multi-country
overlapping-generations model and show that cross-country dierences in nancial de-
velopment explain these three empirical facts. Furthermore, under certain conditions,
despite \uphill" net capital 
ows, full capital mobility may raise aggregate output in the
poor country as well as raise world output in the steady state. Thus, poor countries may
possibly benet from the recent wave of nancial globalization and it is feasible to achieve
Pareto improvement at the world level through international transfer policy. These results
are in contrast to the prediction of conventional neoclassical models.
Credit markets channel resources from the less to the more productive individuals. If
credit markets were perfect, production would be conducted eciently in the sense that
the marginal rate of return is equalized across productive projects. In particular, the rates
of return on loans and equity capital would be equal to the social rate of return. How-
ever, due to domestic nancial frictions, the more productive individuals are subject to
borrowing constraints. Under IFA, due to the constraint on the aggregate credit demand,
the rate of return on loan, i.e., the loan rate, is ineciently lower, while the rate of return
to the equity capital of the more productive individuals, i.e., the equity rate, is higher
than social rate of return. Thus, nancial frictions distort the two interest rates. Further-
more, since the borrowing constraints keep the investment of the more (less) productive
individuals lower (higher) than the socially eciently level, aggregate output is also lower
than in the frictionless case; due to the distortions on interest rates, aggregate savings
are ineciently lower than in the frictionless case and so is aggregate output. This way,
nancial frictions in our model also distort aggregate output through the investment
composition channel and through the elastic savings channel.
We illustrate our major results intuitively in a two-country version of the multi-country
model. The world economy consists of two countries, country N (North) and country S
(South), which are fundamentally identical except that country N is more nancially
developed. Suppose that the two countries are in the steady state under IFA before
capital mobility is allowed. Initially, the loan rate is higher, the equity rate is lower, and
aggregate output is higher in country N than in country S. Under full capital mobility,
the initial interest rate dierentials drive nancial capital 
owing from from country S to
country N and FDI 
owing in the opposite direction. Since country N has a larger credit
market, net capital 
ows are \uphill" from country S to country N. By receiving a higher
return on its foreign assets than what it pays for its foreign liabilities, country N obtains a
positive net investment income, despite its negative net international investment position.
Intuitively, country N \exports" its nancial services through two-way capital 
ows and
3receives a positive net return. This way, our model generates the theoretical predictions
in line with the three empirical facts.
Full capital mobility aects aggregate output in each country directly through the size
of aggregate investment and indirectly through the investment composition channel as well
as through the elastic savings channel. Take country S as an example. First, net capital
out
ows directly reduce total resources available for domestic investment, which tends
to reduce aggregate output. Second, nancial capital out
ows reduce domestic credit
supply and FDI in
ows raise domestic credit demand, which jointly raises the loan rate.
The increase in the loan rate triggers the resource reallocation from the less to the more
productive investment as well as raises aggregate savings, which tends to raise aggregate
output. The direct eect depends on net capital 
ows, while the indirect eects depend
on gross capital 
ows. Under full capital mobility, two-way capital 
ows imply that gross

ows are much larger than net 
ows. Thus, if the initial cross-country dierences in
output distortions are large under IFA, the indirect eects may dominate and full capital
mobility may raise aggregate output in country S, despite net capital out
ows. However,
if FDI 
ows are restricted, capital 
ows become one-way and net 
ows coincide with gross

ows. Thus, the direct eect always dominates so that partial capital mobility strictly
reduces aggregate output in country S.
Full capital mobility has the similar direct and indirect eects on world output. Take
nancial capital 
ows as an example. By cross-country resource reallocation, \up-
hill" nancial capital 
ows reduce (raise) the size of aggregate investment in country S
(N), which tends to widen the cross-country aggregate output gap. Given the concave
aggregate production with respect to aggregate investment in each country, \uphill" nan-
cial capital 
ows tend to reduce the steady-state world output, according to the Jensen's
inequality. For simplicity, we call it the net investment size eect. Meanwhile, nan-
cial capital 
ows raise (reduce) the loan rate in country S (N), which indirectly triggers
within-country resource reallocation among investment projects as well as between
consumption and savings, as mentioned above. In particular, the indirect eects on aggre-
gate output are positive (negative) for country S (N). Since the initial output distortions
is more severe in country S than in country N, the output gains in country S dominate
the output losses in country N. Thus, nancial capital 
ows tend to raise the steady-state
world output. For simplicity, we call it the net indirect eect. The same mechanism
applies to FDI 
ows. Similar as the argument for aggregate output in country S, if the
initial cross-country dierences in output distortions are large under IFA, the net indirect
eects may dominate and full capital mobility may raise world output, despite \uphill"
net capital 
ows. However, if FDI 
ows are restricted, it is more likely that the direct
4eect dominates and partial capital mobility reduces world output.
As widely documented in the literature (Barlevy, 2003; Hsieh and Klenow, 2009; Jeong
and Townsend, 2007; Levine, 1997; Midrigan and Xu, 2009), nancial frictions distort
production eciency in the sense that some resources are ineciently allocated into the
less productive projects. If such distortions were not considered, the eciency analysis of
international capital 
ows would be incomplete and misleading. Our model is also related
to the recent trade literature (Melitz, 2003). In particular, international trade leads to
the reallocation of market shares from less to more productive rms, which generates a
new channel for productivity and welfare gains. International capital 
ows in our model
generate output gains by triggering similar resource reallocation among rms.
To summarize, nancial frictions distort aggregate output through aecting resource
allocation among investment projects with dierent productivity as well as through af-
fecting resource allocation between consumption and savings. According to conventional
neoclassical models (Matsuyama, 2004; von Hagen and Zhang, 2010), \uphill" net capital

ows aect the size of aggregate investment in each country, which reduces aggregate out-
put in the poor country as well as at the world level. As our contribution to the literature,
we show that international capital 
ows indirectly trigger resource reallocation in these
two dimensions, which generates output gains in the poor country as well as at the world
level. Thus, our results complement the predictions of conventional neoclassical models.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the model under IFA and shows
how domestic nancial frictions distort interest rates and aggregate output. Section 3
shows the patterns of international capital 
ows and analyzes the implications on aggre-
gate output. Section 4 addresses the output implications of partial capital mobility where
FDI is restricted. Section 5 concludes and the appendix collects relevant proofs.
2 The Model under International Financial Autarky
2.1 The Model Setting
The world economy consists of N  2 countries, which are fundamentally identical except
the level of nancial development as specied later. There are a nal good, which is
internationally tradable and serves as numeraire, and two types of intermediate goods, A
and B, which are not traded internationally. The prices of intermediate goods in country
i 2 f1;2;:::;Ng and period t are denoted by v
i;A
t and v
i;B
t . In the following, variables in
country i are denoted with the superscript i.
Individuals live for two periods and there is no population growth. In each country,
the population size of each generation is normalized to one and each generation consists
5of two types of agents which we call entrepreneurs and households, each of mass  and
1 , respectively.1 Individuals are endowed with one unit of labor when young and   0
units of labor when old, which they supply inelastically to aggregate production. Thus,
the aggregate labor supply is L = 1 +  in each period.
Final goods are produced contemporaneously using intermediate goods and labor in
the Cobb-Douglas fashion. The input of labor, L, and intermediate goods, M
i;A
t and
M
i;B
t , are rewarded at their respective marginal products. To summarize,
Y
i
t =
"
M
i;A
t
(1   
)
#(1 
)  
M
i;B
t


!
 
L
1   
1 
;where  2 (0;1); 
 2 (0;1]; (1)
!
i
tL = (1   )Y
i
t v
i;A
t M
i;A
t = (1   
)Y
i
t ; v
i;B
t M
i;B
t = 
Y
i
t : (2)
Y i
t and !i
t denote aggregate output of nal goods and the wage rate, respectively. (1 ),
(1 
) and 
 measure the respective factor shares of labor, intermediate goods A and
B. There is no uncertainty in the economy. In this section, we assume that international
capital 
ows are not allowed.
When young, individuals can produce intermediate goods from nal goods and the
production takes one period to complete. Entrepreneurs and households only dier in their
endowment of production opportunities. In particular, young entrepreneurs can produce
both types of intermediate goods while young households can only produce intermediate
good A.2 The rate of transformation from nal goods to intermediate goods is normalized
at unity in both sectors. Thus, the price of intermediate good k 2 fA;Bg in period t+1,
v
i;k
t+1, is also the rate of return to the sector-k investment in period t.
Assumption 1.  2 (0;
).
Assumption 1 ensures that aggregate entrepreneurial net worth is smaller than the
socially ecient investment size in sector B. In equilibrium, entrepreneurs only produce
intermediate good B and they nance part of their project investment using debt.
Individuals have an additive logarithm preference over consumption in two periods,
U
i;j
t = (1   )lnc
i;j
y;t +  lnc
i;j
o;t+1; (3)
1Matsuyama (2004) assumes that individuals are identical ex ante. Due to credit rationing, a fraction
of individuals are randomly chosen to become entrepreneurs ex post and this fraction is endogenously
determined. As shown in von Hagen and Zhang (2010), such an assumption is essential for the symmetry-
breaking property of nancial globalization, but FDI cannot be addressed. In order to analyze the joint
determination of nancial capital and FDI 
ows, we follow the assumption of Antras and Caballero (2009)
by assuming that entrepreneurs account for a xed fraction of population.
2We allow for the case of 
 = 1 where intermediate good B and labor are used in the aggregate
production. In equilibrium, intermediate good A vanishes.
6where c
i;j
y;t and c
i;j
o;t+1 denote its consumption when young and when old, respectively;
j 2 fe;hg denotes the identity of entrepreneur and household, respectively;  2 (0;1]
measures the relative weight of utility from consumption when old in the lifetime welfare.
Consider any particular household born in period t. In period t, it receives the labor
income !i
t, consumes c
i;h
y;t, save si
t = !i
t   c
i;h
y;t in the form of the investment in its own
production project i
i;h
t and the loans to entrepreneurs di
t at the gross loan rate Ri
t. In
period t+1, it receives the project revenue v
i;A
t+1i
i;h
t and the gross deposit return Ri
tdi
t. The
household no-arbitrage condition is
R
i
t = v
i;A
t+1: (4)
In addition, it receives the labor income !i
t+1. It consumes the total wealth c
i;e
o;t+1 =
v
i;A
t+1i
i;h
t + Ri
tdi
t + !i
t+1 = Ri
tsi
t + !i
t+1 before exiting from the economy. Its consolidated
lifetime budget constraint is c
i;h
y;t +
c
i;h
o;t+1
Ri
t = W
i;h
t , where W
i;h
t  !i
t +
!i
t+1
Ri
t denotes the
present value of its lifetime wealth. Given the logarithm utility function (3), the household
optimal consumption-savings choices are,
c
i;h
y;t = (1   )W
i;h
t and c
i;h
o;t+1 = R
i
tW
i;h
t ; (5)
s
i
t = !
i
t   c
i;h
y;t = !
i
t   (1   )
!i
t+1
Ri
t
; (6)
If we assume as in the literature that individuals only have the labor endowment when
young,  = 0, or they only consume when old,  = 1, the second term on the right hand
side of equation (6) vanishes and the savings are inelastic to the loan rate. Here, we allow
for the case of elastic savings by assuming that individuals have the labor endowment
when old,  > 0, and they care about consumption when young,  2 (0;1). Ceteris
paribus, a rise in the loan rate induces the household to save more,
@si
t
@Ri
t > 0.
Consider any particular entrepreneur born in period t. In period t, he receives the labor
income !i
t, consumes c
i;e
y;t, and nances his investment i
i;e
t using own funds ni
t = !i
t   c
i;e
y;t
together with debts zi
t = i
i;e
t   ni
t. In period t + 1, he receives the project revenue v
i;B
t+1i
i;e
t
and the labor income !i
t+1. After repaying the debts, he consumes the rest, c
i;e
o;t+1 =
v
i;B
t+1i
i;e
t  Ri
tzi
t +!i
t+1, before exiting from the economy. Due to limited commitment, the
entrepreneur can borrow only up to a fraction of the future project revenue,
R
i
tz
i
t = R
i
t(i
i;e
t   n
i
t)  
iv
i;B
t+1i
i;e
t : (7)
Following Matsuyama (2004, 2007), we use i 2 [0;1] to measure the level of nancial
development in country i. It captures a wide range of institutional factors and is higher
in countries with more sophisticated nancial and legal systems, better creditor protection,
7and more liquid asset market, etc. We assume that countries only dier in the level of
nancial development, 0  1 < 2 < ::: < N  1.
Dene the rate of return on entrepreneurial equity capital as the equity rate,3
 
i
t 
v
i;B
t+1i
i;e
t   Ri
tzi
t
ni
t
= v
i;B
t+1 + (v
i;B
t+1   R
i
t)(
i
t   1)  R
i
t; (8)
where i
t 
i
i;e
t
ni
t denotes the investment-equity ratio. For a unit of equity capital invested,
the entrepreneur gets v
i;B
t+1 as the marginal return. In addition, he can borrow (i
t   1)
units of debt which provides him the extra return (v
i;B
t+1 Ri
t). The term (v
i;B
t+1 Ri
t)(i
t 1)
captures the leverage eect, depending positively on the debt-equity ratio, (i
t   1) and
the spread, (v
i;B
t+1   Ri
t). In equilibrium, the equity rate should be no less than the loan
rate; otherwise, the entrepreneur would rather lend than borrow. The inequality (8) is
equivalent to Ri
t  v
i;B
t+1 and we call it the participation constraint for the entrepreneur.
If Ri
t < v
i;B
t+1, the entrepreneur borrows to the limit, i.e., he nances the investment,
i
i;e
t , using loans,
iv
i;B
t+1i
i;e
t
Ri
t , and net worth, ni
t, in period t. After repaying the debt in period
t+1, he gets the return to his net worth, (1 i)v
i;B
t+1i
i;e
t . If Ri
t = v
i;B
t+1, the entrepreneur does
not borrow to the limit and the leverage eect vanishes so that  i
t = v
i;B
t+1. To summarize,
 
i
t =
8
> > <
> > :
(1 i)v
i;B
t+1i
i;e
t
ni
t =
(1 i)v
i;B
t+1
1 
ivi;B
t+1
Ri
t
; if Ri
t < v
i;B
t+1,
v
i;B
t+1 if Ri
t = v
i;B
t+1.
(9)
The entrepreneur's consolidated lifetime budget constraint is c
i;e
y;t+
c
i;e
o;t+1
Ri
t = W
i;e
t , where
W
i;e
t  !i
t +
!i
t+1
 i
t denotes the present value of his lifetime wealth. Given the logarithm
utility function (3), the entrepreneur's optimal consumption-savings choices are,
c
i;e
y;t = (1   )W
i;e
t and c
i;e
o;t+1 =  
i
tW
i;e
t ; (10)
n
i
t = !
i
t   c
i;e
y;t = !
i
t   (1   )
!i
t+1
 i
t
; (11)
where the entrepreneurial net worth ni
t is elastic to the equity rate if  > 0 and  2 (0;1).
Aggregate output of intermediate good A and B in period t + 1 are respectively
M
i;A
t+1 = (1   )i
i;h
t and M
i;B
t+1 = i
i;e
t : (12)
The credit market and the nal good market clear in each country,
(1   )d
i
t = z
i
t; ) (1   )(s
i
t   i
i;h
t ) = (i
i;h
t   n
i
t); (13)
C
i
t + I
i
t = Y
i
t ; (14)
3Since the total external values of their projects are restricted by i, entrepreneurs cannot issue equity
after raising loans zi
t. Thus, equity capital is restricted by the entrepreneurial savings.
8where Ci
t  (c
i;e
y;t + c
i;e
o;t) + (1   )(c
i;h
y;t + c
i;h
o;t) and Ii
t  i
i;e
t + (1   )i
i;h
t denote aggregate
consumption and aggregate investment in country i and period t.
Denition 1. Given the level of nancial development i, a market equilibrium in coun-
try i 2 f1;2;:::;Ng under IFA is a set of allocations of households, fi
i;h
t ;si
t;c
i;h
y;t;c
i;h
o;tg, en-
trepreneurs, fi
i;e
t ;ni
t;c
i;e
y;t;c
i;e
o;tg, and aggregate variables, fY i
t ;M
i;A
t ;M
i;B
t ;!i
t;v
i;A
t ;v
i;B
t ;Ri
t; i
tg,
satisfying equations (1)-(2), (4)-(7), (9)-(13),
2.2 Equilibrium Analysis
For the notational convenience, we dene some auxiliary parameters, m 
(1 )
(1+), Q 
(1+)
 (1+m),    1 


, Ai  1 

  i
1  , Bi  1+

  i
 . According to equations (6) and
(11), if  > 0 and  2 (0;1), savings are elastic to interest rates, m > 0; otherwise, m = 0
and savings are inelastic. In this sense, m is an indicator of elastic savings. As shown
below, Q is the steady-state social rate of return in the frictionless case;   is a threshold
value such that, for i 2 (0;  ), the borrowing constraints are binding under IFA and
0 < A
i < 1 < B
i and
@Ai
@i > 0 >
@Bi
@i : (15)
2.2.1 Intratemporal versus Intertemporal Relative Prices
Let i
t+1 
v
i;A
t+1
v
i;B
t+1
denotes the relative price of two intermediate goods and we call it the
intratemporal relative price.
In period t, Ii
t units of nal goods are invested to produce M
i;A
t+1 and M
i;B
t+1 units
of intermediate good A and B in period t + 1, where M
i;A
t+1 + M
i;B
t+1 = Ii
t. Let 	i
t 
v
i;A
t+1M
i;A
t+1+v
i;B
t+1M
i;B
t+1
Ii
t denote the social rate of return to aggregate investment. Given the
Cobb-Douglas aggregate production function, it is trivial to prove that 	i
t =
v
i;A
t+1
1 
(1 i
t+1).
The loan rate and the social rate of return are essentially the intertemporal prices of
household savings and aggregate savings, respectively. Let  i
t 
Ri
t
	i
t denote their ratio and
we call it the intertemporal relative price. Substitute away v
i;A
t+1 using the household
no-arbitrage condition (4), the two relative prices are positively related,
 
i
t =
Ri
t
	i
t
= 1   
(1   
i
t+1): (16)
As shown below, the intra- and inter-temporal relative prices re
ect the distortions of
nancial frictions on investment composition and individual welfare, respectively.
92.2.2 The General Solution to Equilibrium Allocation
The total savings of households in period t, (1   )si
t, have the rate of return Ri
t, while
those of entrepreneurs, ni
t, have the rate of return  i
t. In period t+1, aggregate revenue
of intermediate goods v
i;A
t+1M
i;A
t+1 + v
i;B
t+1M
i;B
t+1 = L!i
t+1 is distributed among households
and entrepreneurs. Using equations (6) and (11) to substitute away si
t and ni
t, we get
(1   )s
i
tR
i
t + n
i
t 
i
t = L!
i
t+1 ) (1   )R
i
t +  
i
t =
!i
t+1
!i
t
Q: (17)
Let Xi
IFA denote the steady-state value of variable Xi
t under IFA. If the borrowing con-
straints are binding, the model solutions are as follows,
I
i
t =
!i
t
m + 1

1  
m(1   Ai)(Bi   1)
(m + Ai)(m + Bi)

; (18)
 
i
t =
!i
t+1
!i
t
Q

1 +
Bi   1
m + 1

=
!i
t+1
!i
t
Q

1 +


1 + m
    i


; (19)
R
i
t =
!i
t+1
!i
t
Q

1  
1   Ai
m + 1

=
!i
t+1
!i
t
Q

1  


1 + m
    i
1   

; (20)
	
i
t =
!i
t+1
!i
t
Q

1 +
m(1   Ai)(Bi   1)
(m + 1)(m + AiBi)

; (21)
 
i
t =  
i
IFA = 1  
(1   Ai)Bi
m + Bi = 1  


1 + m
1+

  i

    i
1   
; (22)

i
t+1 = 
i
IFA = 1  
1


(1   Ai)Bi
m + Bi = 1  
1
1 + m
1+

  i

    i
1   
; (23)
!
i
t+1 =

i
t
Q
!
i
t

where 
i
t = 
i
IFA =
(i
IFA)

1  


1+m
  i
1 
; (24)
@ lni
IFA
@i =
m(Bi   1) + Bi(1   Ai)(1

   1)
i
IFA(Bi + m)(Ai + m)
@Ai
@i  
m(1   Ai)
i
IFA(Bi + m)2
@Bi
@i : (25)
The two relative prices, i
t+1 and  i
t, are time-invariant. The domestic production indi-
cator i
t measures the eciency of domestic production and is time-invariant. Aggregate
output is proportional to the wage rate, Y i
t =
(1+)!i
t
(1 ) . Thus, the model dynamics are
characterized by the dynamics of wages. According to equation (24), given  2 (0;1),
there exists a unique and stable steady state with the wage at wi
IFA =

i
IFA
Q

.
According to equations (19)-(20),   is the threshold value in the sense that for i 2
(0;  ), Ri
t <  i
t and the borrowing constraints are binding. For i 2 ( ;1], the borrowing
constraints are slack, Ri
t =  i
t, and the frictionless allocation is obtained by plugging
i =   and Ai = Bi = 1 into equations (18)-(24), which are summarized in lemma 1.
Lemma 1. For i 2 [ ;1], the borrowing constraints are slack and there exists a unique
and stable non-zero steady state in country i with the wage at !IFA = Q .
10The private and social rates of return coincide, Ri
t =  i
t = 	i
t = v
i;A
t+1 = v
i;B
t+1 =
!i
t+1
!i
t Q.
In the steady state, Ri
IFA =  i
IFA = 	i
IFA = Q.
Aggregate investment
!i
t
1+m is allocated in the two sectors, proportional to their respec-
tive factor shares, M
i;A
t+1 = (1   
)
!i
t
1+m and M
i;B
t+1 = 

!i
t
1+m. The relative prices and the
domestic production indicator are constant at unity, i
IFA =  i
IFA = i
IFA = 1.
We take this frictionless allocation as the benchmark and analyze the case of i 2 (0;  )
where the borrowing constraints are binding. In particular, we address the distortions of
nancial frictions on interest rates and aggregate output.
2.2.3 Financial Frictions and Interest Rates
In the frictionless case, the private and social rates of return coincide. In the case with
nancial frictions, the constraint on aggregate credit demand keeps the loan rate lower
than the social rate of return in order to clear the credit market, and entrepreneurs benet
from the ineciently low loan rate so that the equity rate is higher than the social rate
of return, i.e., Ri
t < 	i
t <  i
t. Thus, nancial frictions distort the interest rates,
which has the distributional eect on individual welfare.
2.2.4 Financial Frictions and Aggregate Output
Aggregate output in the steady state is positively related to the domestic production
indicator, Y i
IFA = 1+
1 !i
IFA = 1+
1 Q (i
IFA). In the frictionless case, i
IFA = 1. In the
case with nancial frictions, i
IFA < 1, if m > 0 and (or) 
 2 (0;1). In the following, we
show that nancial frictions distort aggregate output through two distinct channels, i.e.,
the investment composition channel and the elastic savings channel.
The Investment Composition Channel
In order to highlight the investment composition channel, we shut down the elastic sav-
ings channel by setting m = 0.4 According to equations (6) and (11), the individual
savings become inelastic to interest rates and aggregate investment is proportional to the
aggregate labor income of young individuals, Ii
t = !i
t.
In the frictionless case, given 
 2 (0;1), the sectoral investments of intermediate good
A and B are proportional to their relative factors share (1   
) and 
. In the case with
nancial frictions, the binding borrowing constraints lead to the over- (under-) propor-
tional investment in sector A (B). Since two intermediate goods are imperfect substitutes
4It can be done by assuming that individuals do not have the labor endowment when old,  = 0, or
they only consume when old,  = 1.
11in aggregate production, the distortion on the cross-sector investment reduces aggregate
production eciency and the steady-state aggregate output.5 This way, nancial frictions
distort aggregate output through the investment composition channel. According to
equation (25), a rise in i improves cross-sector investment and the domestic production
indicator is higher,
@ lni
IFA
@i =
(1 Ai)( 1

 1)
i
IFAAi
@Ai
@i > 0, given m = 0 and 
 2 (0;1).
In the frictionless case, i
IFA = 1; in the case with nancial frictions, the distortion on
the cross-sector investment keeps the price of intermediate good A (B) lower (higher) than
the socially ecient level so that i
IFA 2 (0;1). According to equation (23), i
IFA rises
in i and has the maximum value of one at i =  . Thus, a higher intratemporal relative
price re
ects smaller output distortion through the investment composition channel.
The Elastic Savings Channel
In order to highlight the elastic savings channel, we shut down the investment composition
channel by setting 
 = 1. Final goods are produced using labor and intermediate good B.
In equilibrium, intermediate good A vanishes and only entrepreneurs produce intermediate
goods. The intratemporal relative price becomes meaningless and is substituted by the
intertemporal relative price,  i
t = i
t+1, according to equation (16).
In the frictionless case, the loan rate coincides with the social rate of return and
Ii
t =
!i
t
1+m. In the case with nancial frictions, the loan rate is lower while the equity
rate is higher than the social rate of return. The ineciently low loan rate depresses the
household savings, while the ineciently high equity rate encourages the entrepreneurial
savings. According to equation (18), Ii
t <
!i
t
1+m so that the steady-state aggregate output
is lower than in the frictionless case. Thus, nancial frictions distort aggregate output
through the elastic savings channel. According to equation (25), a rise in i raises
aggregate savings and investment so that the domestic production indicator is higher,
@ lni
IFA
@i = m
 i
IFA(m+Bi)

Bi 1
Ai+m
@Ai
@i   1 Ai
Bi+m
@Bi
@i

> 0, given m > 0 and 
 = 1.
In the frictionless case,  i
IFA = 1; in the case with nancial frictions, the constraint on
aggregate credit demand keeps the loan rate lower than the social rate of return so that
 i
IFA 2 (0;1). According to equation (22),  i
IFA rises in i and has the maximum value
of one at i =  . Thus, given m > 0, a higher intertemporal relative price re
ects smaller
output distortion through the elastic savings channel.
5In the New Keynesian monetary models with sticky nominal prices, a non-zero in
ation rate distorts
production among monopolistic-competitive rms, which generates eciency losses. By analogy, nancial
frictions distort the cross-sector investment and aggregate output is lower than in the frictionless case.
12The Case with No Distortion on Aggregate Output
The two channels can be shut down together by setting 
 = 1 and m = 0. Since only
intermediate good B is produced and aggregate savings are inelastic to interest rates,
nancial frictions do not distort aggregate output through the two channels, i
IFA = 1,
according to equation (25). In this case, nancial frictions still distort interest rates.
Proposition 1 summarizes the property of market equilibrium with nancial frictions.
Proposition 1. For i 2 [0;  ), the borrowing constraints are binding and there exists a
unique and stable non-zero steady state in country i with the wage at !i
IFA =

i
IFA
Q

.
Financial frictions create a wedge between the private and social rates of return, Ri
t <
	i
t <  i
t. In the steady state, the loan rate is higher while the equity rate is lower in the
country with a higher level of nancial development.
Financial frictions may distort aggregate output through the investment composition
channel and (or) the elastic savings channel, depending on the parameter values of m
and 
. In the presence of output distortions, the intra- and inter-temporal relative prices
re
ect the distortions through the two channels, respectively, and the steady-state aggregate
output increases in the level of nancial development.
3 Full Capital Mobility
We consider full capital mobility where individuals are allowed to lend and make direct
investments abroad. Without loss of generality, we assume 0  1 < 2 < ::: < N   
such that the borrowing constraints are binding in the steady state in all countries under
IFA and under full capital mobility. We also assume that all countries are initially in the
steady state under IFA before capital mobility is allowed from period t = 0 on.
Let i
t and 
i
t denote the aggregate out
ows of nancial capital and FDI from country
i in period t, respectively, with negative values indicating capital in
ows. Financial capital
out
ows reduce the domestic credit supply, (1 )(si
t i
i;A
t ) i
t, while FDI out
ows reduce
the aggregate equity capital for domestic investment, ni
t   
i
t. Thus, FDI 
ows raise
(reduce) the aggregate credit demand in the host (source) country. With these changes,
the analysis in section 2 carries through, due to the linearity of preferences, productive
projects, and borrowing constraints. In particular, nancial capital 
ows equalize the loan
rate across the border and the credit markets clear in each country as well as at the world
level; FDI 
ows equalize the equity rate across the border and the world equity capital
market clears; FDI 
ows directly aect aggregate output of intermediate good B in each
country. To summarize,
13N X
i=1

i
t =
N X
i=1


i
t = 0; R
i
t = R

t;  
i
t =  

t;
(1   )(s
i
t   i
i;A
t ) = (
i
t   1)(n
i
t   

i
t) + 
i
t; M
i;B
t+1 = 
i
t(n
i
t   

i
t):
Except them, the equations of market equilibrium in each country are same as under IFA.
Aggregate savings of households in all countries in period t, (1   )
PN
i=1 si
t, have the
same rate of return at R
t, while those of entrepreneurs, 
PN
i=1 ni
t, have the same rate
of return  
t. In period t + 1, aggregate revenue of intermediate goods
PN
i=1(v
i;A
t+1M
i;A
t+1 +
v
i;B
t+1M
i;B
t+1) = L
PN
i=1 !i
t+1 is distributed among households and entrepreneurs in all coun-
tries. Let !w
t 
PN
i=1 !i
t
N denote the world average wage in period t. Using equations (6)
and (11) to substitute away si
t and ni
t, we get
(1   )R

t +  

t =
!w
t+1
!w
t
Q: (26)
Dene a country-specic auxiliary parameter, pi
IFA 
 i
IFA
Q = 1 +


1+m
  i
 . Let XFCM
denotes the steady-state value of variable X under full capital mobility. The model
solutions under full capital mobility are,
 
i
t =
!w
t+1
!w
t
 
i
IFA  
!w
t+1
!w
t
Z
i
FCM; where Z
i
FCM 
(i
FCM   i
IFA) i
IFA
(i
FCM   i
IFA) + 1 i
(1 )pi
IFA
(27)
R
i
t =
!w
t+1
!w
t
R
i
IFA +

1   
!w
t+1
!w
t
Z
i
FCM: (28)

i
FCM =
(1   i)Ri
t
 i
t
+ 
i; (29)
 
i
FCM = 1   
(1   
i
FCM); (30)

i
t = (1   )!
i
t

1  
!i
t+1
!i
t
Ri
IFA
R
t

(31)


i
t = !
i
t

1  
!i
t+1
!i
t
 i
IFA
 
t

(32)


i
t + 
i
t = !
i
t

1  
!i
t+1
!i
t


 i
IFA
 
t
+ (1   )
Ri
IFA
R
t

(33)
!
i
t+1 =

(1   i)R
t
 
t
+ 
i


(
1
R
t
)
: (34)
Lemma 2. Under full capital mobility, the two relative prices are time-invariant and
there exists a unique and stable steady state.
Proof. See appendix B.
143.1 The Steady-State Patterns of International Capital Flows
In the steady state,
!i
t+1
!i
t = 1. Substituting it into equations (27)-(33), the steady-state
patterns of interest rates and capital 
ows are,
 
i
FCM =  
i
IFA   Z
i
FCM; (35)
R
i
FCM = R
i
IFA +

1   
Z
i
FCM; (36)

i
FCM = (1   )!
i
FCM

1  
Ri
IFA
R
FCM

= !
i
FCM
Zi
FCM
R
FCM
; (37)


i
FCM = !
i
FCM

1  
 i
IFA
 
FCM

=  !
i
FCM
Zi
FCM
 
FCM
; (38)

i
FCM + 

i
FCM = !
i
FCMZ
i
FCM
( 
FCM   R
FCM)
 
FCMR
FCM
: (39)
Proposition 2. In the steady state, there exists a threshold value of the country index ^ N
such that the world interest rates are R
FCM 2 (R
^ N
IFA;R
^ N+1
IFA] and  
FCM 2 [ 
^ N+1
IFA; 
^ N
IFA).
In country i 2 f1;2;:::; ^ Ng, full capital mobility raises the relative prices, i
FCM > i
IFA
and  i
FCM >  i
IFA, the gross and net capital 
ows are i
FCM > 0 > 
i
FCM and i
FCM +

i
FCM > 0; the opposite applies for country i 2 f ^ N + 1; ^ N + 2;:::;Ng. Similar as under
IFA, the relative prices increase in i, 
i+1
FCM > i
FCM and  
i+1
FCM >  i
FCM. Gross interna-
tional investment return sums up to zero in each country, i
FCMR
FCM +
i
FCM 
FCM = 0.
Proof. See appendix B.
In the presence of output distortion, the steady-state aggregate output is higher in
country i 2 f ^ N + 1; ^ N + 2;:::;Ng than in country i 2 f1;2;:::; ^ Ng under IFA. Under
full capital mobility, country i 2 f ^ N + 1; ^ N + 2;:::;Ng, which has the level of nancial
development above the world average, imports nancial capital and exports FDI. Since
the rate of return to its foreign assets (FDI out
ows) is higher than the interest rate it
pays for its foreign liabilities (nancial capital in
ows),  
FCM > R
FCM, country i 2 f ^ N +
1; ^ N+2;:::;Ng receives a positive net international investment income, i
FCM(R
FCM 1)+

i
FCM( 
FCM 1) = 0 (i
FCM+
i
FCM) > 0, despite its negative international investment
position, i
FCM + 
i
FCM < 0. This way, our model shows analytically that cross-country
dierences in nancial development explain the three recent empirical evidences.
In the following, we address the implication of full capital mobility on aggregate out-
put. For simplicity, we focus on the two-country version, i.e., the world economy consists
of country S (South) and country N (North) with 0  S < N <  . In other words,
country S represents the group of country i 2 f1;2;:::; ^ Ng, while country N represents
the group of country i 2 f ^ N + 1; ^ N + 2;:::;Ng.
153.2 International Capital Flows and Aggregate Output
In the absence of output distortion, i.e., m = 0 and 
 = 1, aggregate output is identical in
both countries at !i
IFA = Q  under IFA. In the steady state under full capital mobility,
\uphill" net capital 
ows reduce (raise) the size of aggregate investment in country S
(N) so that aggregate output in country S (N) is strictly lower (higher) than under IFA,
which we call the investment size eect; given the concave aggregate production with
respect to intermediate goods, world output is lower than under IFA, which we call the
net investment size eect. This way, net capital 
ows aect aggregate output at the
country and at the world level directly through cross-country resource reallocation.
In the presence of output distortion, international capital 
ows aect aggregate output
directly through cross-country resource reallocation as mentioned above and indirectly
through the investment composition channel and the elastic savings channel.
3.2.1 The Investment Composition Channel
We focus on the investment composition channel by setting m = 0 and 
 2 (0;1). Under
full capital mobility, capital 
ows aect directly the size and indirectly the composition of
aggregate investment in each country. Take country S as an example. Net capital out
ows
directly reduce the size of aggregate investment. Meanwhile, nancial capital out
ows
reduce the credit supply and FDI in
ows raise the credit demand, which jointly raises
the loan rate. The rise in the loan rate induces households to reduce their investment in
sector A. Since sector A is initially over-invested under IFA, full capital mobility indirectly
improves the cross-sector investment, re
ected by the rise in the intratemporal relative
price. The direct eect is negative for aggregate output and depends on net capital 
ows,
while the indirect eect is positive and depends on gross capital 
ows. Under full capital
mobility, two-way capital 
ows imply that gross 
ows are much larger than net 
ows.
Under certain conditions, the indirect eect may dominate the direct eect so that full
capital mobility may raise aggregate output in country S, despite net capital out
ows.
For the illustration purpose, we show the steady-state patterns in a numerical exam-
ple. The benchmark values of parameters are chosen as follows:  = 0:1 implies that
entrepreneurs account for 10% of population,  = 0:36 implies that the labor income
accounts for 64% of aggregate output, 
 = 0:5 implies that intermediate goods A and B
have the equal factor share in the aggregate production function,  = 0:4 implies that
individuals consume 60% of their lifetime income when young and save 40% for future,
 = 0 implies that individuals do not have labor endowment when old and thus, m = 0.
The threshold value is   = 1  


 = 0:8.
Figure 1 compare the steady-state patterns of the model economy under full capital
16mobility versus under IFA, given N =  . The horizontal axes denote S 2 [0;  ], the
vertical axis of the bottom-right panel denotes the percentage dierence of world output
under the two scenarios, while the vertical axes of other panels denote the levels.
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Figure 1: Steady-State Patterns under Full Capital Mobility versus under IFA
The steady-state patterns of capital 
ows, interest rates, and the intratemporal relative
prices conrm the results in propositions 2. In the following, we focus on aggregate output.
Proposition 3. The positive investment size eect strictly dominates the negative compo-
sition eect in country N so that Y N
FCM > Y N
IFA. Given N, there exists a threshold value
^ S
IC. For S 2 [0; ^ S
IC), the positive investment composition eect dominates the negative
investment size eect in country S so that Y S
FCM > Y S
IFA; for S 2 (^ S
IC;N), the opposite
applies. Furthermore, Y S
FCM < Y N
FCM.
Proof. See appendix B.
Figure 2 shows the threshold value ^ S
IC in the parameter space of (N;S), given

 2 f0:2;0:5;0:8g, respectively. Take 
 = 0:5 as an example and  2  1  

0:5 denotes
the corresponding threshold value for N. Given the assumption of 0  S < N   2,
the feasible parameter space of (N;S) is denoted by the triangular region below the 45
degree line and to the left of the middle dashed line. The downward-sloping solid line
denoted by 
 = 0:5 species ^ S
IC as a function of N 2 (0;  2). As long as the parameter
17values are in the region above this solid line, full capital mobility reduces the steady-state
aggregate output in country S; otherwise, the opposite applies.
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Figure 2: ^ S
IC as a Function of N: 
 2 f0:2;0:5;0:8g
The direct and indirect eects on aggregate output in country S depend ultimately on
the cross-country dierences in nancial development. Given N, the smaller S is, the
larger the cross-country interest rate dierentials and the output distortions in country
S are under IFA. It is more likely that the indirect eect dominates the direct eect. By
the same logic, the threshold value ^ S
IC declines in N, given 
.
Similarly, besides the negative net investment size eect, full capital mobility aect
world output indirectly through the investment composition channel. In particular, both
nancial capital and FDI 
ows improve (worsen) production eciency in country S (N)
by aecting the cross-sector investment. Given 0  S < N   , aggregate output is
distorted more severely in country S than in country N under IFA. Thus, the eciency
gains in country S dominate the eciency losses in country N so that gross capital 
ows
tend to aect world output positively. We call it the net investment composition eect.
The net investment size eect depends on net capital 
ows, while the net investment com-
position eect depends on gross capital 
ows. According to gure 1, given the benchmark
values of parameters, the net composition eect dominates the net size eect so that,
despite \uphill" net capital 
ows, full capital mobility raises world output, which is
in contrast to the predictions of the conventional neoclassical models. The logic is same
as mentioned above for aggregate output in country S.
In the numerical example with 
 = 0:5 where nancial frictions distort investment
composition under IFA, full capital mobility raises world output for N =   and S 2 [0;  ),
while in the case of 
 = 1 where nancial frictions do not distort investment composition
18under IFA, full capital mobility reduces world output. In the following, we analyze how

 may reshape the world output implications of full capital mobility.
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Figure 3: Full Capital Mobility and World Output: 
 = 0:75
For the illustration purpose, we set 
 = 0:75 while keeping other parameter values
same as in the benchmark case. Given N =  , gure 3 shows the percentage dierences
of world output under full capital mobility and under IFA, with S 2 [0;N) on the
horizontal axis. There exists two threshold values: 0 < ~ S
1 < ~ S
2 < N. For S 2 (~ S
1; ~ S
2),
full capital mobility reduces world output; for S 2 (0; ~ S
1)[(~ S
2;N), the opposite applies.
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Figure 4: Full Capital Mobility and World Output: Threshold Values
More generally, gure 4 shows the threshold values  , ~ S
1, and ~ S
2 in the space of
(
;S), given N =  . The horizontal axis denotes 
 2 (0;1) and the vertical axis denotes
S 2 (0;1). Curve PQ represents the threshold value    1  


. We focus on the case
19of 0  S < N =  , i.e., the region below curve PQ. There exists a threshold value


FCM such that if 
 2 (;

FCM), full capital mobility strictly raises world output; if

 2 (

FCM;1), full capital mobility may or may not raise world output for S 2 [0;N).
Curve PK in gure 3 represents the two threshold values ~ S
1 and ~ S
2 as functions of 
.
To sum up, region A denotes the region to the right of curve PK and region B denotes
the region between curve PK and PQ. For (
;S) in region B, full capital mobility raises
world output; for (
;S) in region A, the opposite applies.
Whether full capital mobility raises the steady-state world output depends on the
relative magnitude of the net investment composition eect and the net investment size
eect, which is determined ultimately by the interest rate dierentials and the cross-
country dierences in output distortion under IFA.
3.2.2 The Elastic Savings Channel
We focus on the elastic savings channel by setting m > 0 and 
 = 1. Under full capital
mobility, capital 
ows aect directly the size of domestic investment and indirectly the
size of domestic savings. Take country S as an example. Domestic investment is nanced
by the dierence between domestic savings and net capital out
ows, Ii
t = (1 )si
t+ni
t 
(i
t+
i
t). Net capital out
ows directly reduce the size of domestic investment. Meanwhile,
nancial capital out
ows and FDI in
ows jointly raise the loan rate and reduce the equity
rate, which is re
ected by the rise in the intertemporal relative price. The rise in the loan
rate induces households to raise their savings while the decline in the equity rate induces
entrepreneurs to reduce their savings. In the net term, gross capital 
ows indirectly raise
domestic savings. The direct eect is negative for aggregate output and depends on net
capital 
ows, while the indirect eect is positive and depends on gross capital 
ows. By
the same logic as mentioned in subsection 3.2.1, under certain conditions, the indirect
eect may dominate the direct eect so that full capital mobility may raise aggregate
output in country S, despite net capital out
ows.
We calculate the steady-state patterns by setting 
 = 1 and  = 1 while keeping the
values for others parameters same as in the benchmark case of subsection 3.2.1. In other
words, we assume that only intermediate good B is used in the aggregate production and
that individuals are endowed with one unit of labor when old and thus, m > 0. The
steady-state patterns of capital 
ows, interest rates, relative prices, aggregate output at
the country and at the world level are qualitatively identical as in gure 1.
Proposition 4. For N =  , it always holds that Y N
FCM > Y N
IFA. There always exits a
threshold value ^ S
ES 2 (0;N] as a function of N such that for S 2 (0; ^ S
ES), the positive
20savings eect dominates the negative investment size eect in country S, Y S
FCM > Y S
IFA.
Furthermore, Y S
FCM < Y N
FCM.
In general, if  2 (0;0:5), there are three scenarios as follows.
1. if m 2 (0;1), it holds that Y S
FCM > Y S
IFA, for S 2 (0;
1 
p
1 4m2(1 )
2 ), and that
Y N
FCM > Y N
IFA, for N 2 (
1 
p
1 4m2(1 )
2 ;  );
2. If m 2 (1;
[(1 )] 0:5
2 ), it holds that Y S
FCM > Y S
IFA, for S 2 (0;
1 
p
1 4m2(1 )
2 ) [
(
1+
p
1 4m2(1 )
2 ;  ), and that Y N
FCM > Y N
IFA, for N 2 (
1 
p
1 4m2(1 )
2 ;
1+
p
1 4m2(1 )
2 ).
3. If m >
[(1 )] 0:5
2 , it holds that Y S
FCM > Y S
IFA, for S 2 (0;  ).
If  2 (0:5;1), there are two scenarios as follows.
1. if m 2 (0;1), it holds that Y S
FCM > Y S
IFA, for S 2 (0;
1 
p
1 4m2(1 )
2 ), and that
Y N
FCM > Y N
IFA, for N 2 (
1 
p
1 4m2(1 )
2 ;  );
2. If m > 1, it holds that Y S
FCM > Y S
IFA, for S 2 (0;  ).
Proof. See the proof of proposition 3 in appendix B.
For N not in the ranges specied in the three cases of proposition 4, the negative
savings eect may dominate the positive investment size eect in country N so that full
capital mobility may reduce aggregate output in country N, despite net capital in
ows.
Our benchmark parameter values of , , and  imply that m < 1. Thus, the rst
scenario of proposition 4 applies. Figure 5 shows the threshold value ^ S
ES in the parameter
space of (N;S), given  2 f0:2;0:6;1g, respectively. Take  = 1 as an example. Given
the assumption of 0  S < N   , the feasible parameter space of (N;S) is denoted by
the triangular region below the 45 degree line. The downward-sloping solid line denoted
by  = 1 species ^ S
ES as a function of N 2 (0;  ). As long as the parameter values are
in the region below this solid line, full capital mobility raises the steady-state aggregate
output in country S, despite net capital out
ows; otherwise, the opposite applies.
The intuition is same as mentioned in subsection 3.2.1 for aggregate output in country S.
Besides the negative net investment size eect, full capital mobility aects world out-
put indirectly through the elastic savings channel. In particular, nancial capital and
FDI 
ows raise (reduce) aggregate savings in country S (N) by aecting interest rates.
Given 0  S < N   , aggregate savings is depressed more severely in country S than in
country N under IFA. Thus, under full capital mobility, the rise in the aggregate savings
in country S dominate the decline in country N so that gross capital 
ows aect world
output positively. We call it the net savings eect. The net investment size eect depends
21T
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Figure 5: ^ S
ES as a Function of N:  2 f0:2;0:6;1g
on net capital 
ows, while the net savings eect depends on gross capital 
ows. Given
our parameter values, in particular,  = 1 and 
 = 1, the net savings eect dominates
the net investment size eect so that, despite \uphill" net capital 
ows, full capital
mobility raises world output. The logic is same as mentioned in subsection 3.2.1.
By setting  = 0:2 and 
 = 1 while keeping other parameter values same as in the
benchmark case of subsection 3.2.1, we calculate the percentage dierences of the steady-
state world output under full capital mobility and under IFA for S 2 [0;N), given
N =  . The patterns are qualitatively identical as in gure 3. In particular, there exists
two threshold values: 0 < ~ S
1 < ~ S
2 < N, such that for S 2 (~ S
1; ~ S
2), full capital mobility
reduces world output; for S 2 (0; ~ S
1) [ (~ S
2;N), the opposite applies.
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Figure 6: Full Capital Mobility and World Output: Threshold Values
More generally, gure 6 shows the threshold values  , ~ S
1, and ~ S
2 in the space of (;S),
22given N =  . The horizontal axis denotes  2 (0;1). The threshold value    1    is
independent of  and represented by line PQ. We focus on the case of 0  S < N =  ,
i.e., the region below line PQ. There exists a threshold value 
FCM such that for  > 
FCM,
full capital mobility raises world output; otherwise, full capital mobility may or may not
raise world output. The two threshold values ~ S
1 and ~ S
2 mentioned above are functions
of  and represented by curve PO.
To sum up, region A (B) denotes the region to the left (right) of curve PO. For (;S)
in region B, full capital mobility raises world output; otherwise, the opposite applies. The
logic is same as mentioned in subsection 3.2.1.
In the presence of domestic nancial frictions, capital does not 
ow to the place where
the marginal product of capital is higher but to the place where the private rate of return
is higher. Thus, international capital 
ows may not necessarily raise world output in
our model. Such a result has a signicant welfare and policy implications. As shown in
von Hagen and Zhang (2010), capital 
ows have opposite welfare implications to dierent
individuals within and across countries. As long as capital mobility can raise world output,
nancial globalization is still a positive-sum game and it is possible to achieve Pareto
improvement at the world level through domestic and international transfers; otherwise,
nancial globalization is a negative-sum game and strictly reduces world welfare, which
cannot be oset through international transfers.
4 Partial Capital Mobility
In order to compare with the scenario of full capital mobility, we consider here the scenario
of partial capital mobility under which individuals are allowed to lend abroad but not to
make direct investment abroad.6 The steady-state patterns of capital 
ows and relative
prices are similar as under full capital mobility. We put the detailed analysis in appendix
A and focus here on the output implications of partial capital mobility.
The initial cross-country loan rate dierentials under IFA drive nancial capital 
ows
from country S to country N under partial capital mobility. Besides the direct invest-
ment size eect, nancial capital 
ows have an indirect eect through the investment
composition channel and (or) the elastic savings channel. Under partial capital mobility,
capital 
ows are one-way and net 
ows coincide with gross 
ows. Thus, the direct eect
6There exists another scenario where individuals are allowed to make direct investment but not to lend
abroad. In that case, households in country i can lend domestically, make direct investment domestically
or abroad. The non-arbitrage condition leads to the cross-country loan rate equalization, despite the
restriction on nancial capital 
ows. The allocation is identical as in the scenario of full capital mobility.
23always dominates the indirect eect so that the steady-state aggregate output strictly
rises (declines) in country N (S) under partial capital mobility.
Besides the negative net investment size eect through widening the cross-country
output gap, nancial capital 
ows have the indirect positive eect on the steady-state
world output through the investment composition channel and (or) the elastic savings
channel. In the case with the investment composition channel only, there exists a threshold
value 

PCM such that for 
 2 (

PCM;1), there exists ~ S
PCM. Given N =  , for S 2
(0; ~ S), partial capital mobility raises the steady-state world output; for S 2 (~ S;N),
the opposite applies. In the case with the elastic savings channel only, given  2 (0;1),
there exists a threshold value ~ S such that for S 2 (~ S;N), partial capital mobility
reduces the steady-state world output; otherwise, the opposite applies.
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Figure 7: Partial Capital Mobility and World Output: Threshold Values
We calculate the threshold values in the two cases and compare them with those under
full capital mobility. The left and the right panels of gure 7 correspond to gure 4 and
6, respectively. Take the left panel as an example. The dashed line refers to the threshold
values under full capital mobility, while the downward sloping curve between region B
and C refers to the threshold value under partial capital mobility. If the parameter values
of (
;S) is in region C, full (partial) capital mobility raises (reduces) the steady-state
world output. Similar results prevail in the case with the elastic savings channel only.
Intuitively, as mentioned in subsection 3.2, the net investment size eect depends on
net 
ows while the indirect positive eect depends on gross 
ows. Under partial capital
mobility, net and gross capital 
ows coincide. Thus, it is more likely that the negative
net investment size eect dominates so that the steady-state world output declines.
245 Conclusion
We develop a tractable multi-country model where domestic nancial frictions distort in-
terest rates. Given the cross-country dierences in nancial development, the interest rate
dierentials drive international capital 
ows and the theoretical predictions are consistent
with the empirical patterns in the recent past.
We then use this model to address the aggregate output implications of international
capital 
ows. Besides the direct eects on aggregate output through cross-country re-
source reallocation, both nancial capital 
ows and FDI have the indirect eects through
within-country resource reallocations in the investment composition channel and in the
elastic savings channel. Under certain conditions, the indirect eects may dominate so
that, despite \uphill" net capital out
ows, full capital mobility may raise the steady-state
aggregate output in the poor country as well as world output. Our results complement
conventional neoclassical models by identifying the two distinct channels.
Our model diers from conventional neoclassical models only in the presence of nan-
cial frictions. International capital 
ows ameliorate the distortions of nancial frictions
on interest rates and aggregate output. The theoretical results of our model may serve as
the benchmark for further investigations on the implications of international capital 
ows
in the presence of increasing returns, endogenous growth, technology-promoting FDI, etc.
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A Partial Capital Mobility
Financial capital 
ows equalize the loan rate across the border and the credit markets
clear in each country as well as at the world level,
R
i
t = R

t; (1   )(s
i
t   i
i;A
t ) = (
i
t   1)n
i
t + 
i
t; and
N X
i=1

i
t = 0:
Except them, the equations of market equilibrium in each country are same as under IFA.
The model solutions are
 
i
t =
!i
t+1
!i
t
 
i
IFA (40)
R
i
t =
!i
t+1
!i
t
R
i
IFA +
!i
t+1
!i
t
Z
i
t+1; where Z
i
t+1 
(i
t+1   i
IFA) i
IFA
1   i ; (41)

i
t+1 =
(1   i)Ri
t
 i
t
+ 
i; (42)
 
i
t = 1   
(1   
i
t+1); (43)

i
t = (1   )!
i
t

1  
!i
t+1
!i
t
Ri
IFA
Ri
t

(44)
!
i
t+1 =

i
t
Q
!
i
t

; where 
i
t 
(i
t+1)
(1   i)
(i
t+1   i)pi
IFA
; (45)
@ lni
t
@i
t+1
=  
i
t+1(1   
) + 
i
i
t+1(i
t+1   i)
< 0 (46)
Let XPCM denote the steady-state value of variable X under partial capital mobility.
27Lemma 3. There exists a unique and stable steady state under partial capital mobility.
Proof. See appendix B.
In the steady state, the interest rates and nancial capital 
ows are
 
i
FCM =  
i
IFA; (47)
R
i
PCM = R
i
IFA + Z
i
PCM; where Z
i
PCM 
(i
PCM   i
IFA) i
IFA
1   i ; (48)

i
FCM = (1   )!
i
FCM
Zi
PCM
R
FCM
; (49)
Proposition 5. In the steady state, there exists a threshold value of the country index
~ N such that R
~ N
IFA < R
FCM  R
~ N+1
IFA. The world loan rate is R
FCM 2 (R
~ N
IFA;R
~ N+1
IFA]
and the equity rate in each country is same as under IFA,  i
PCM =  i
IFA. In country
i 2 f1;2;:::; ~ Ng, partial capital mobility leads to nancial capital out
ows, i
PCM > 0,
which raises the relative prices, i
PCM > i
IFA and  i
PCM >  i
IFA, and reduces aggregate
output, Y i
PCM < Y i
IFA; the opposite applies for country i 2 f ~ N + 1; ~ N + 2;:::;Ng.
The steady-state relative prices increase in i, 
i+1
PCM > i
PCM and  
i+1
PCM >  i
PCM.
Proof. See appendix B.
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Figure 8: Partial Capital Mobility and World Output
For the illustration purpose, we show the percentage dierences of the steady-state
world output under partial capital mobility versus under IFA in two cases, given N =  
and S 2 [0;  ]. In the rst case, we set 
 = 0:5 and  = 0 while keeping the values of other
parameters same as in the benchmark case so that we feature the investment composition
channel only, while in the second case, we set 
 = 1 and  = 1 while keeping the values
of other parameters same as in the benchmark case so that we feature the elastic savings
28channel only. The left and the right panels of gure 8 show the two cases, respectively
and the axis scalings are same as in gure 3. In each case, there exists a threshold value
~ S such that for S 2 (0; ~ S), partial capital mobility raises the steady-state world output;
otherwise, the opposite applies. See section 4 for further analysis.
B Proofs
Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. The proof consists of three steps. First, we prove that equation (27) is the solution
to the equity rate under full capital mobility. If the borrowing constraints are binding, it
holds under IFA and under full capital mobility,

i
t+1 =
Ri
t(1   i)
 i
t
+ 
i; )
i
t+1
1   i =
Ri
t
 i
t
 
Ri
IFA
 i
IFA
; where 
i
t+1  
i
t+1   
i
IFA: (50)
According to equation (17), (1   )Ri
IFA +  i
IFA = Q. Substituting Ri
t and Ri
IFA with
 i
t and  i
IFA using equation (26) and Ri
IFA = 1
(1 )(Q    i
IFA), we solve the equity rate
from equation (50). Plug in the solution to the equity rate in equation (26) to solve Ri
t.
Second, we prove that i
t+1 is constant under full capital mobility. Let us assume
that i
t+1 is time variant and so is the auxiliary variable Zi
t+1 dened in equation (27).
According to equation (27), the equity rate equalization in country i and N implies that
 
i
IFA   Z
i
t+1 =  
N
IFA   Z
N
t+1; ) (1   )

i
t+1
1   i  
N
t+1
1   N

=
1
pN
IFA
 
1
pi
IFA
; (51)
)
@i
t+1
@N
t+1
=
1   i
1   N > 0: (52)
Using equations (27) and (32), we rewrite the condition,
PN
i=1 
i
t = 0, into
N X
i=1
Z
i
t+1!
i
t+1 = 0 (53)
Given the Cobb-Douglas production function, !i
t+1 = (i
t+1)
(Ri
t) . Combining it with
the loan rate equalization, Ri
t = R
t, we rewrite equation (53) into
N X
i=1
K
i
t+1 = 0; where K
i
t+1 
pi
IFAi
t+1(i
t+1 + i
IFA)

i
t+1 + 1 i
(1 )pi
IFA
; (54)
@Ki
t+1
@i
t+1
= K
i
t+1
8
<
:
1
i
t+1
h
(1 )pi
IFA
1 i i
t+1 + 1
i +


i
t+1 + i
IFA
9
=
;
> 0: (55)
29Substituting i
t+1 with N
t+1 using equations (51), the left-hand side of equation (54)
becomes a monotonically increasing function of N
t+1,
@
PN
i=1 Ki
t+1
@N
t+1
=
N X
i=1
@Ki
t+1
@i
t+1
@i
t+1
@N
t+1
> 0: (56)
For N
t+1 = 0, equation (51) implies that i
t+1 > 0. Given i
t+1 > 0, Ki
t+1 > 0. Thus,
the left-hand side of equation (54) is larger zero for N
t+1 = 0. There exits a unique
solution to N
t+1 which is smaller than zero and time-invariant. Using equations (51),
we can then solve i
t+1 for i 2 f1;2;:::;N   1g, accordingly.
Finally, we prove the existence of a unique and stable steady state under full capital
mobility. i
t+1 is time-invariant and so is Zi
t+1. Let Ri
FCM  Ri
IFA +

1 Zi
FCM which is
same across countries, Ri
FCM = R
FCM. Thus, the loan rate depends on the dynamics of
the world-average wages and so is the wage in country i,
!
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
!w
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!w
t
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
FCM
 
(
i
FCM)

:
The dynamics of the world-average wages are
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w
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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FCM)

N
#1 
Given  2 (0;1), the phase diagram of the world-average wage is concave. Thus, there
exists a unique and stable steady state. Proportional to the wage, aggregate output in
country i is determined by the world output dynamics.
Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. According to equation (20), the steady-state loan rate in country i monotonically
increases in i under IFA, which together with equation (37) and the world credit market
clearing condition,
PN
t=1 i
FCM = 0, implies that there exists a threshold value of the
country index ^ N such that Z
^ N
FCM > 0  Z
^ N+1
FCM. Thus, the world loan rate is R
FCM 2
(R
^ N
IFA;R
^ N+1
IFA]. According to equations (17) and (26), it holds in the steady state that
(1   )Ri
j +  i
j = Q, where j 2 fIFA;FCMg denotes the scenario of IFA and full
capital mobility. Thus,  
FCM 2 [ 
^ N+1
IFA; 
^ N
IFA).
Given that Zi
FCM monotonically increases in i
FCM and R
FCM 2 (R
^ N
IFA;R
^ N+1
IFA), it
is obvious that full capital mobility raises the relative prices in country i 2 f1;2;:::; ^ Ng,
i
FCM > i
IFA and  i
FCM >  i
IFA. The gross equity premium is by denition,
 i
FCM
Ri
FCM
=
301 i
i
FCM i, and the cross-country equalization implies that
1 i
FCM
1 i =
1 i+1
FCM
1 i+1 =
i+1
FCM i
FCM
i+1 i >
0. Given i+1 > i, it holds that 
i+1
FCM > i
FCM. According to equation (30), we
get  
i+1
FCM >  i
FCM. Similar as under IFA, the relative prices under full capital mobil-
ity monotonically increase in i. According to equations (37) and (38), the changes in
the interest rates imply that in country i 2 f1;2;:::; ^ Ng, i
FCM > 0 > 
i
FCM. Since
 
FCM > R
FCM, the steady-state net capital 
ows have the same sign as Zi
FCM, according
to equation (39). Thus, i
FCM + 
i
FCM > 0 in country i 2 f1;2;:::; ^ Ng. The opposite
applies to country i 2 f ^ N + 1; ^ N + 2;:::;Ng.
According to equations (37) and (38), the gross international investment returns are
R

FCM
i
FCM +  

FCM

i
FCM = !
i
FCM(1   )(Z
i
FCM   Z
i
FCM) = 0:
Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. According to equations (17), (26), (34), the steady-state relative prices, interest
rates, and wages have the same relationship under full capital mobility and under IFA,
!
i
j = (
i
j)

(R
i
j)
 ; 
i
j =
Ri
j
 i
j
(1   
i) + 
i;  
i
j + (1   )R
i
j = Q: (57)
where j 2 fIFA;FCMg refers to the scenarios of IFA and full capital mobility, respec-
tively. Under full capital mobility, !i
FCM = (i
FCM)
(Ri
FCM) , RS
FCM = RN
FCM and
S
FCM < N
FCM jointly imply that !S
FCM < !N
FCM, or equivalently, Y S
FCM < Y N
FCM.
For the notational convenience, we normalize interest rates by Q and dene two aux-
iliary variables, ri
j 
Ri
j
Q and pi
j 
 i
j
Q. Equation (57) implies that ri
j =
1 pi
j
1  . Given i, wi
j
is a function of the normalized equity rate pi
j,
!
i
j =
1
Q

(1   i)ri
j
pi
j
+ 
i


(r
i
j)
 : (58)
The allocation under IFA is a special case of that under full capital mobility where S =
N. In the steady state, given S, the world equity rate changes with N and the wage
rate in country S changes accordingly. The rst derivative of !i
j with respect to pi
j is
@!i
j
@pi
j
= !
i
j
i
h
(1 ri
j)2
 + 1
1 
i
  ri
j
h
ri
j   (1   i)
(1 
)
1 
i
[(1   i)ri
j + ipi
j]pi
jri
j
: (59)
Since @Ai
i =


1  > 0, we get Ai
min =
1 

1  for i = 0.
r
i
min =
m + Ai
min
m + 1
> A
i
min =
1   

1   
> (1   
i)
(1   
)
1   
) r
i
j > (1   
i)
(1   
)
1   
:
31The second component in the numerator of equation (59) is strictly positive.
@!i
j
@pi
j has the
same sign as the numerator N i
j  i
h
(1 ri
j)2
 + 1
1 
i
 ri
j
h
ri
j   (1   i)
(1 
)
1 
i
. If N i
j > 0, a
marginal decline in ri
j keeps
@!i
j
@pi
j > 0; if N i
j < 0, a marginal rise in ri
j keeps
@!i
j
@pi
j < 0.
According to equations (19)-(20), pi
IFA = m+Bi
m+1 and ri
IFA = m+Ai
m+1 . Evaluate
@!i
j
@pi
j in the
steady state under IFA by substituting pi
IFA and ri
IFA into equation (59), we get
@!i
IFA
@pi
IFA
= !
i
IFA
[AiBi   m2   (Bi + m)Bi (1 
)
(1 )
](1   Ai)(m + 1)
(m + Ai)(m + Bi)(m + AiBi)
(60)
We rst consider the case with the investment composition channel only, i.e., m = 0
and 
 2 (0;1). Equation (60) is simplied into
@!i
IFA
@pi
IFA
= !
i
IFA

i(    i)
(1   )2(Ai)2Bi (61)
For i = 0 or i =  ,
@!i
IFA
@pi
IFA
= 0; for i 2 (0;  ),
@!i
IFA
@pi
IFA
> 0.
Consider country N. Full capital mobility reduces the steady-state loan rate, which
raises the numerator N N
j of equation (59). For N =  , N N
IFA = 0. Thus, it always hold
that N N
FCM > N N
IFA = 0 or equivalently,
@!N
FCM
@pN
FCM
> 0. Thus, by raising the steady-state
equity rate, full capital mobility raises the steady-state aggregate output, Y N
FCM > Y N
IFA.
By analogy, we can prove that Y N
FCM > Y N
IFA for N 2 (0;  ).
Consider country S. Full capital mobility raises the steady-state loan rate, which re-
duces the numerator N S
j of equation (59). For S = 0, N S
IFA = 0. Thus, it always hold
that N S
FCM < N S
IFA = 0 or equivalently,
@!S
FCM
@pS
FCM
< 0. Thus, by reducing the steady-state
equity rate, full capital mobility raises the steady-state aggregate output. For S 2 (0;N),
@!S
IFA
@pS
IFA
> 0 and N S
FCM < N S
IFA. If S is slightly lower than N, it is likely that N S
FCM is
still positive, or equivalently,
@!S
FCM
@pS
FCM
> 0. Thus, by reducing the steady-state equity rate,
full capital mobility reduces the steady-state aggregate output, Y S
FCM < Y S
IFA. In con-
trast, for S much lower than N, it is likely that N S
FCM < 0, or equivalently,
@!S
FCM
@pS
FCM
< 0.
Thus, by reducing the steady-state equity rate, full capital mobility raises the steady-state
aggregate output, Y S
FCM > Y S
IFA. Thus, there exists a threshold value ^ S
IC such that for
S 2 [0; ^ S
IC), Y S
FCM > Y S
IFA, and for S 2 (^ S
IC;N), the opposite applies.
Let us then consider the case with the elastic savings channel only, i.e., m > 0 and

 = 1. Equation (60) is simplied into
@!i
IFA
@pi
IFA
= !
i
IFA
[AiBi   m2](1   Ai)(m + 1)
(m + Ai)(m + Bi)(m + AiBi)
(62)
The sign of
@!i
IFA
@pi
IFA
depends on the numerator [AiBi  m2](1 Ai) =
h
i(1 i)
(1 )   m2
i
(  i)
1  .
32For N =  , the numerator is equal to zero and
@!i
IFA
@pi
IFA
= 0. As mentioned above
for the case with the investment composition channel, full capital mobility strictly raises
the steady-state aggregate output in country N. For S = 0, the numerator is smaller
than zero and
@!i
IFA
@pi
IFA
< 0. By analogy, full capital mobility strictly raises the steady-state
aggregate output in country S.
T
i T 0
1
H
m
2
T
1
T
i T 0
1
H
m
2
T
1 T
2
T
i T 0
1
H
m
2
T
i T 0
1
m
2
T
1
T
i T 0
1
m
2
~ ~ ~
~
_ _ _
_ _
Figure 9: Threshold Values under Various Scenarios
Figure 9 shows all possible cases on the relative size of
i(1 i)
(1 ) and m2 where the three
panels in the rst row show the cases with  2 (0;0:5), the two panels in the second row
show the cases with  2 (0;5;1), and the horizontal axis shows i 2 (0;  ).
Given  2 (0;0:5),
i(1 i)
(1 ) is a hump-shaped function of i 2 (0;1   ). In particular,
i(1 i)
(1 ) 2 (0; 1
4(1 )) and point H denotes its highest value 1
4(1 ) > 1.
 If m 2 (0;1), there exists a threshold value ~ 1 =
1 
p
1 4m2(1 )
2 such that, for
i 2 (0; ~ 1),
h
i(1 i)
(1 )   m2
i
(  i)
1  < 0 and, for i 2 (~ 1;  ), the opposite applies.
 If m 2 (1;
[(1 )] 0:5
2 ), there exists two threshold values ~ 1 =
1 
p
1 4m2(1 )
2 and
~ 2 =
1+
p
1 4m2(1 )
2 such that for i 2 (~ 1; ~ 2),
h
i(1 i)
(1 )   m2
i
(  i)
1  > 0 and, for
i 2 (0; ~ 1) [ (~ 2;  ), the opposite applies.
33 If m >
[(1 )] 0:5
2 , for i 2 (0;  ), it holds that
h
i(1 i)
(1 )   m2
i
(  i)
1  < 0.
Given  2 (0;0:5),
i(1 i)
(1 ) is a monotonically increasing function of i 2 (0;1   ). In
particular,
i(1 i)
(1 ) 2 (0;1).
 If m 2 (0;1), there exists a threshold value ~ 1 =
1 
p
1 4m2(1 )
2 such that, for
i 2 (0; ~ 1),
h
i(1 i)
(1 )   m2
i
(  i)
1  > 0 and, for i 2 (~ 1;  ), the opposite applies.
 If m > 1, for i 2 (0;  ),
h
i(1 i)
(1 )   m2
i
(  i)
1  < 0.
By the same logic as in the case of the investment composition channel, we can prove the
results in the ve scenarios of Proposition 4.
Proof of Lemma 3
Proof. Combining equations (41) and (45), we rewrite the dynamic equation of wages,
ln!
i
t+1 =  lnR

t + 
ln

!i
t
!i
t+1
R

t
(1   i)
 i
IFA
+ 
i

: (63)
The rst and the second derivatives of !i
t+1 with respect to !i
t are
@!i
t+1
@!i
t
=
!i
t+1
!i
t



 + 1 + i
i
t+1 i
2

0;
!i
t+1
!i
t

@!i
t+1
@2!i
t
=  
@!i
t+1
@!i
t
!i
t
(!i
t+1)2

!i
t+1
!i
t
 
@!i
t+1
@!i
t

!i
t
!i
t+1
(1 + 
) +
i
1   i
 i
IFA
R
t
 1
Since
@!i
t+1
@!i
t 2

0;
!i
t+1
!i
t

, we get
@!i
t+1
@2!i
t < 0. Thus, the phase diagram of wages is a concave
function under partial capital mobility if the borrowing constraints are binding.
According to equation (63), for !i
t = 0, the phase diagram has a positive intercept on
the vertical axis at !i
t+1 = (R
t) (i)(
). Dene a threshold value  !i
t =  i
IFA(R
t)
  1
1 .
For !i
t 2 (0;  !i
t), the phase diagram of wages is monotonically increasing and concave. For
!i
t >  !i
t, aggregate saving and investment in sector B is so high that the intratemporal
relative price is equal to one, or equivalently, Ri
t = v
i;B
t+1. Thus, the borrowing constraints
are slack and the phase diagram is 
at with !i
t+1 =  !i
t+1 = (R
t) . Given R
t < Q <  i
IFA,
we get  !i
t+1 <  !i
t. In other words, the kink point is below the 45 degree line.
Thus, the phase diagram of wages crosses the 45 degree line once and only once from
the left, and the intersection is in its concave part. Thus, the model economy has a unique
and stable steady state under partial capital mobility.
Proof of Proposition 5
34Proof. Following the proof of proposition 2, there exists a threshold value of the country
index ~ N such that R
PCM 2 (R
~ N
PCM;R
~ N+1
PCM]. In the steady state, partial capital mobility
raises the relative prices and equation (46) implies that partial capital mobility reduces
aggregate output in country i 2 f1;2;:::; ~ Ng, i.e., i
PCM > i
IFA,  i
PCM >  i
IFA, and
Y i
PCM < Y i
IFA. The opposite applies to country i 2 f ~ N + 1; ~ N + 2;:::;Ng.
In the steady state,  i
PCM =  i
IFA and equation (19) imply that  i
PCM >  
i+1
PCM. The
loan rate equalization implies that
 
i
PCM

1  
1   i
PCM
1   i

=  
i+1
PCM

1  
1   
i+1
PCM
1   i+1

; )
1   i
PCM
1   i >
1   
i+1
PCM
1   i+1
1   
i > 1   
i+1; ) 1   
i
PCM > 1   
i+1
PCM
Thus, the steady-state relative prices rise in i, i.e., 
i+1
PCM > i
PCM. Given !i
PCM = h
(i
PCM)

R
PCM
i
, the steady-state wage under partial capital mobility also rises in i.
35